Swarthmore College

Works
History Faculty Works

History

1992

On Liberty, Society, And Politics: The Essential Essays Of William
Graham Sumner
W. G. Sumner
Robert C. Bannister
Swarthmore College

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history
Part of the History Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
W. G. Sumner and Robert C. Bannister. (1992). "On Liberty, Society, And Politics: The Essential Essays Of
William Graham Sumner". On Liberty, Society, And Politics: The Essential Essays Of William Graham
Sumner.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history/169

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
History Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

Foreword
William Graham Sumner, as his contemporaries testified, was someone
you liked a lot or not at all. During his four decades at Yale, undergrad
uates thronged to his classes. “In my estimation, he was the greatest
teacher I have ever known,” one of his early students wrote when Sum
ner died in 1910. Even the radical economist Thorstein Veblen, who
attended Yale for graduate studies in the early 1880s, reported that he
was “particularly” pleased with Sumner. In the following decades, a
loyal band of Sumnerites, led by his protege Albert G. Keller, kept alive
a “Sumner Club” to promote his teachings.
Others were less charitable. Commenting on an anonymous review in
the Nation, one angry reader guessed that Sumner must have been the
author since no one else was “capable of so bigoted a hatred.” When he
opposed Free Silver in the mid-1890s, one westerner wondered how
“such an arrogant jackass . . . can occupy a chair in a college at Yale.”
When Sumner’s Folkways appeared in 1906, a disgruntled reader lik
ened it to “a card index.” “Now and then are interspersed some general
conclusions,” he added, “which shock without convincing.”
Inevitably, much of the debate about Sumner turned on his politics.
To his defenders, he provided an arsenal of arguments against the en
croachment of government. To his critics, he was, at worst, a “business
hireling” and, at best, the confused spokesman of an older middle class
whose day was done. Often conflating the two charges, historians pic
tured him as the leading “social Darwinist” of his generation, a theorist
who appropriated the rhetoric of evolutionism to defend the worst ex
cesses of unregulated capitalism. Despite challenges to this view during
the past two decades, he remains the late nineteenth-century thinker
American history textbooks most like to hate. Sumner’s blunt, uncom
promising, and often provocative manner was partly to blame for this
situation. “Bluff Billy,” as he was called, did not suffer fools easily.
There were other factors at work that contributed to this view of Sum
ner, not all of which were of his own making. Many critics quoted a few
phrases concerning “fittest” and “unfittest” as the sum of his social
thought. Focusing on his views of government and the economy, most
historians and critics failed to place his work within the broader context
of the effort of several generations of American intellectuals to ground
ix
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morals and public policy in science rather than in Protestant Christian
ity. As a member of the “generation of 1840” who initiated this move
ment, Sumner shared in this enterprise with the sociologist Lester Ward
and the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., among others, even though he
did not share their politics. As these intellectuals debated the meaning
of science, the charge of misapplied Darwinism (including the epithet
“social Darwinist”), as I have argued in Social Darwinism: Science and
Myth (1979), was essentially a battle strategy of the opponents of this
movement, more caricature than accurate characterization. Critics also
assumed that Sumner’s ideas remained static throughout his career.
Quotations from lectures of the 1870s or from Folkways became inter
changeable evidence of a monolithic ideology.
The image of Sumner that emerges from these criticisms seriously
misrepresents him. He launched his career in a decade with more than
its share of corruption and fraud, including the scandals of the Grant
presidency and New York’s Tweed Ring, the financial buccaneering of
Jay Gould, the “corrupt bargain” that gave Rutherford B. Hayes the pres
idency in 1876. Yet he was as critical of these developments as were the
self-styled “reformers” whose proposals, in his view, only compounded
the problems. During the 1880s and 1890s, he continued to defend free
markets, individual enterprise, and the accumulation of capital. How
ever, he was acutely aware of mounting problems, from the rise of plu
tocracy (defined broadly as the influence of wealth on politics) to the
excesses of consumerism and of democracy. The United States was en
tering its “glory days,” he lamented shortly before his death, referring
to the “corruption and extravagance which ultimately have ruined all
the republics of the past.” In sounding these warnings, he seemed to his
admirers to be the epitome of the “old Roman,” a defender of the re
publican tradition of the founders, not the business “hireling” or the
spirit of individualism past.
Sumner’s “conservatism” was accordingly complex. As he moved
from clergyman to sociologist, he struggled to reconcile two contradic
tory impulses: a desire for organic community, historical continuity, and
traditional values as antidote to unfettered individualism and materi
alistic progress; and a commitment to individual freedom that he be
lieved would fuel this progress. Gomplicating this dilemma was the
specter of cultural relativism wherein all truth appeared relative to con
ditions. In freeing the individual from past custom and tradition, cul
tural relativism appeared to rule out any common standard for
individual behavior or public policy. In his early sermons, Sumner con-
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fronted these issues in repeated attempts to balance “tradition” and
“progress.” In Folkways, he discussed them in terms of the relation be
tween the “mores” and “science,” the former being the encoded customs
and traditions that shape all human activity, and the latter being the
objective attitude that allows limited escape from those customs and
traditions.
In this quest, Sumner’s conception of science was crucial. Since the
eighteenth century, science had been seen as a means of freeing human
ity from the burdens of the past, while providing for one or another type
of social engineering. Inspired by Darwin, many of Sumner’s contem
poraries found in evolution the basis for an instrumental view of reason
that justified governmental activism and a relativism that rejected es
tablished institutions and beliefs. Sumner, in contrast, distinguished the
“methods” of science from its “speculations,” viewing the former in
terms of the narrowly inductive procedures of what American intellec
tuals of his generation termed “Baconian” science (dubiously claiming
lineage from the celebrated seventeenth-century English scientist Fran
cis Bacon). Science, so viewed, was not some “ism,” but a matter-offactness that stressed classification over hypothesis.
Although on the surface Sumner shared his generation’s faith in sci
ence, he diverged from a majority of his fellow social scientists by re
jecting the notion that science taught that truth is merely a consensus
of trained observers. Sumner’s “expert” was not a credentialed member
of a social scientific community that drew up social blueprints to meet
changing conditions—the model that was increasingly used in Ameri
can sociology in the decades after Sumner’s death. Rather, Sumner’s
expert was the tough-minded individual who viewed current mores
objectively in the light of history. In grasping the essence behind ap
pearance, science, in Sumner’s view, provided an absolute standard for
individual behavior and social policy, and hence an escape from a de
bilitating relativism and moral anarchy.
While Sumner defended private property, individual enterprise, and
laissez-faire, he was not an uncritical apologist for American business.
Rather, he joined a tradition of American thinkers who championed
republicanism against democracy, hard work and self-denial over ma
terial luxury, and public good over individual gratification. Unlike the
founding fathers, Sumner did not ground his conservatism in the clas
sical republicanism of Greece or Rome, but in scientific method and an
ethos of professionalism that sought the equivalents of public virtue in
discipline, denial, and detachment. Although some contradictions
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remained, he took more seriously than many of his contemporaries the
problems of change vs. tradition and cultural relativism vs. common
standards that continue to dominate our discourse more than a century
later.

Youth and Education

Born in Paterson, New Jersey, on October 30,1840, Sumner was the son
of recent English immigrants. A mechanic by training, his father Thomas
left the low wages and unemployment of Lancashire just in time to feel
the sting of the American depression of 1837. He was distantly related
by marriage to a prominent free-trader and temperance advocate, whose
causes he made his own. However, as his son later recalled, he was also
contemptuous of “demagogical arguments,” “the notions of labor agi
tators,” and “the entire gospel of gush.” After losing an eye in an indus
trial accident and his health to a lifetime of toil, Thomas died in 1881
almost as poor as he was when he arrived in the New World, remembered
only as the “forgotten man” of his son’s best-known essay.
As a youth, Sumner enjoyed neither the security of place nor the
comforts of the emotional life. After surveying prospects from New York
to Ohio, his father moved the family to New Haven and then to Hartford.
The death of his mother Sarah in 1848 placed eight-year-old William
and his younger brother, Joseph Graham, in the custody of a stepmother
whose concern with economy at the expense of affection grieved even
her taciturn husband. Still grief-stricken, the brothers even plotted to
kill their stepmother, which may have been the last time they thoroughly
agreed on anything. Although Sumner never referred to his youthful
deprivations and, indeed, rarely mentioned his childhood, these expe
riences left him with a keen sense of the separation between the inner
and outer life, between private and public spheres, and between senti
ment and fact. As an adult, Sumner’s sternness was legendary. Never
theless, a tenderness also surfaced with surprising intensity in love
letters he wrote to his fiancee and, later, in his fondness for children, an
indulgence he once desired from his parents but never received.
Excessively serious, even a bit of a prig, young Sumner compensated
for what he was missing at home by throwing himself into his school
work. After rigorous training in the public school in Hartford, with the
help of money his father made in one of his rare successful ventures,
Sumner entered Yale in 1859. There he plodded through the ironclad
curriculum that the Yale faculty report of 1828 had prescribed for all of
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antebellum America: two years of the classics, a third that added physics
and some astronomy and chemistry, and a fourth that included lectures
in history, politics, and international law. Outside the classroom, Sum
ner discovered a more vital Yale—in eating clubs, in the Brothers in
Unity debating society, in sports (where he was a keen follower of the
Yale “Navy”), and finally in Skull and Bones, whose coveted election
he received in the spring of his junior year. Fueling this vitality was a
markedly changed student body as sons of business magnates from New
York, Chicago, and other cities swelled classes previously drawn mostly
from New England and settlements of New Englanders throughout the
Midwest. Sumner’s friend Henry Holt dated the change precisely to 1856
when the first group of New Yorkers entered Yale, bringing with them a
“revolutionary quantity of new clothes.”
Yale gave Sumner a new identity, replacing the dour William with the
more congenial “Graeme,” as his fellow Bones men came to call him.
Yale also provided Sumner with connections who supplied him with
the funds for several years of European study. A fellow Bones man then
put Sumner’s name forward for a tutorship at Yale, a position he occu
pied upon his return from Europe.
For the ambitious Yale man, the Civil War was largely an inconve
nience. Although some of Sumner’s classmates marched in torchlight
parades for Abraham Lincoln and responded to the call to enlist after
Sumter, enthusiasm soon waned. Less than a third of the class of 1863,
including nongraduates, saw any military service. Although Sumner
later portrayed the war as a victory for the forces of modernity, he was
less optimistic at the time. Distrusting northern leaders, he feared that
Lincoln’s emergency war measures threatened to create a dictatorship.
Within his own family, his postwar lack of enthusiasm for suffrage for
the freedmen estranged him from his brother Joe (later a clerk at the New
Orleans office of the Freedmen’s Bureau), and even brought a reprimand
from his father. Feeling no guilt for his failure to enlist, he scurried
frantically to salvage his European studies, while his father used a $300
loan from a brother of a friend of Sumner’s to arrange a substitute after
Sumner was drafted in July 1863. Although one candidate Thomas
found “skedaddled” out a hotel window with the money, the govern
ment accepted the transaction as meeting the legal requirement. Thus,
as Sumner’s biographer Donald Bellomy has commented, “No one died
(or lived) in Sumner’s place.”
Although marriage lay in the future, Sumner’s interest in the opposite
sex also developed during his college years. He knew he was no ladies
man. “I am not the sort of man women love,” he once confessed, but
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this realization did not keep him from trying. At several parties, he
became jealous when a classmate hested him for the favors of Jeannie
Elliott, a pretty relative of a locally prominent family. By the spring of
his senior year, he became deeply involved with a young woman from
Hartford, only to be devastated when she died shortly before his
graduation.
Happily, in the summer of 1869, after several years of studying abroad
and another three as classics tutor at Yale, Sumner again met Jeannie
Elliott while vacationing in the Catskills. Until their marriage in April
1871, he poured out his yearnings and hopes in letter after letter. When
he announced his engagement, friends looked on in disbelief at a Sum
ner they had not previously known. One colleague wrote, “1 still find it
difficult to associate so much emotion as an engagement involves with
a being whose composition I have hitherto supposed to consist only of
pure thought.” By this time, still another Sumner had emerged as Epis
copalian clergyman, a career for which he had been preparing more or
less since entering Yale.
As Sumner entered his twenties, he was headed for success. However,
the story of his youth had not quite followed the usual Horatio Alger
plot. Although he was the upwardly mobile son of a recent immigrant,
he did not pretend or wish to be the legendary self-made man. In a letter
to his fiancee, written soon after he left New Haven for New York, he
said that many people would say that “I have ‘succeeded’ & say that I
have ‘made my way up,’ ” but they would be wrong. He had never set
out to “ ‘rise in the world,’ ” he added, echoing Alger’s recently pub
lished Ragged Dick (1868). He later told his students, “the ‘self-made
man’ is, by definition, the first bungling essay of a bad workman.”
Nor, given his many debts to community and friends, had his youth
provided a homily on “individualism” in the way some nineteenth
century Americans used the term. “Individualism,” he told his congre
gation a few years later, reduces a man to the status of the “wild beast,”
destroying the “union and organization” that make society possible. In
later years, he continued to inveigh against the man “on the make.”
Sumner’s individualism was not a creed of “go-it-alone and devil-takethe hindmost.” Rather, it was a code of discipline, duty, and responsi
bility within the confines of external restraints, whether imposed by
Providence, one’s profession, or the social norms he later termed
“mores.” Philosophically, Sumner tried to address the limits of free will,
and he wrestled with this issue throughout his career with mixed suc
cess. In his personal life, it took the form of a professionalism that linked
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individual advancement with self-discipline and hard work. For society,
it meant finding and obeying the “laws” that alone make freedom
possible.

Preacher
In the spring of 1869, Sumner left Yale and plunged into Anglican
church politics, first as editor of The Living Church and assistant pastor
in New York and New Haven and then as minister of The Church of the
Redeemer in Morristown, New Jersey, from 1870 to 1872. At the time,
the Episcopalians were torn between a High Church and a Low Church
group, the one stressing dogma and tradition, the other emphasizing
evangelical conversion. Sumner identified with a third and moderate
Broad Church faction that was more open to reason and science. The
Broad Church creed was summed up in the title of his journal. The
Living Church—“living,” because it addressed the most vital issues then
confronting Christianity, and “church” because the issues could be re
solved within this historically evolved institution.
By the late 1860s, Sumner’s religious ideas were still in flux. Con
verted from his parent’s Anglicanism to Congregationalism in his youth,
he later had come to feel less sympathy with the lingering revivalism of
his own congregation than with the anti-revivalist views of Hartford’s
most famous Congregationalist, Horace Bushnell, While studying in
Germany, he had dabbled briefly with the rationalism of the “higher
criticism” (the study of biblical writings to determine their literary his
tory and the purpose and meaning of the authors) before being returned
to “common sense” by the Oxford Anglicans. At Oxford, he also dis
covered Richard Hooker’s Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (15971662), a treatise that combined an attack on excessive reverence for a
literal interpretation of the Bible with a celebration of constitutional
order and historical continuity. Peer pressure from home pulled Sumner
in the direction of the Episcopalians, “We are all of us Episcopalians,
Bill, and you must be the same, can’t you,” wrote friend William Whit
ney on behalf of the Bones group. Upon returning to Yale, Sumner joined
his friends and the Episcopalians.
Although conventions of the pulpit ruled out specific references to
current affairs, Sumner used his sermons to tackle the most pressing
intellectual and social issues of the day. His sermon titles alone told
much of the story: “Ill-Gotten Wealth,” “Individualism,” “Tradition and
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Progress,” and “Solidarity of the Human Race.” In the Broad Church
spirit, he sought in each case a middle ground upon which contending
factions could unite.
A case in point was the mounting conflict between religion and sci
ence, not a “warfare” of opposing groups (as Cornell president Andrew
D. White would soon imply), but a battle over the nature of science itself.
Negotiating this thicket, Sumner distinguished science as “method”
from the “speculations” of individual scientists. He found “no great
fault” with Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, or Herbert Spencer in “their
original works,” he told his New Jersey congregation, “They may be right
or wrong in their speculations and theories,” but they were “honest,
sincere, and industrious” in method. What this method was he was not
yet prepared to say, although he was still disposed to the narrowly in
ductive Baconianism he first learned at Yale.
Sumner also sought compromise on the merits of “tradition” and
“progress.” “The traditions of centuries have a true moral authority,” he
told his parishioners. “We must begin with the world as we find it, that
is, as it is handed down to us from the past.” But he also cautioned that
the “true use of tradition” should be distinguished from “traditional
ism,”—the blind acceptance of “old errors” and “worn-out falsehoods.”
The issue was personal as well as theological. During his stay at Ox
ford, tradition in the form of English class snobbery made Sumner
acutely aware of his own humble origins. Like many an American Ox
onian in similar circumstances, he accommodated by embracing English
tradition with the passion of the half-converted, chiding fellow Amer
icans for their lack of tradition. But the spirit of progress in post-Civil
War America proved equally contagious. “When I came back,” he later
wrote his fiancee, “I saw that the vast body of people here were free,
prosperous, free from care, & happy, & that is worth all the elegance it
robs us of.” This inner tension, as it turned out, dovetailed neatly with
the desire of most Anglicans to avoid the excesses of either the High or
Low Church positions, as he soon demonstrated in the sermon “Tradi
tion and Progress.”
In an age when career patterns remained fluid, Sumner was soon un
happy within the church. Friends showered him with advice concerning
alternative careers—in law, perhaps even in commerce. In the spring of
1871, a week before he proposed marriage to Jeannie, he was offered the
presidency of the University of Alabama at the princely sum of $5,000
a year. At Yale, friends lobbied on his behalf for a faculty position, the
job he really wanted, although in precisely what field remained to be
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seen. For two years, obstacles delayed the appointment: Jeannie had no
wish to be a faculty wife, and the $2,000 his friends were able to raise
initially was too little. Finally, in September 1873, he returned to Yale.
Sumner’s reasons for leaving the clergy and the legacy of this expe
rience have been the subject of considerable speculation. Denying a
crisis of faith, he later quipped that he merely put his beliefs in a drawer,
only to find them gone when next he looked. He never officially resigned
from the clergy, served as a vestryman, and attended various church
functions until his death. At the other extreme, he once remarked cyn
ically to a student that one of two wasted periods in his life was when
he was “a parson.” (The second one was when he was active politically
during the 1870s.)
Sumner’s refusal to break cleanly with the church probably reflected
a desire not to offend his wife and other family members, perhaps
coupled with a reluctance to undermine so powerful a source of social
authority. As he grappled with questions of faith and reason, tradition
and progress, and solidarity and individualism, Sumner’s ideas did
change. His analysis gradually secularized in tone, a shift already evi
dent in an 1873 revision of an earlier sermon, “The Solidarity of the
Human Race.” However, this change registered his participation in a
broad transformation of western thought rather than any sudden con
version to the ideas of Spencer or Darwin.
The clerical years, nonetheless, left their mark. Affording an oppor
tunity to develop his oratorical skills and prose style, the pulpit allowed
Sumner scope to discuss pressing issues, both philosophical and social.
If some of the answers changed, the questions remained remarkably the
same, notably those concerning tradition and progress. For Sumner, this
issue involved two deeply held, but potentially contradictory convic
tions: a belief in history and institutions as a check on progress, and an
instinctive commitment to individual freedom. For someone who would
be at once “conservative” and “American,” this dilemma admitted no
easy solution.

Educational Reformer, Politician, Polemicist

When Sumner returned to New Haven in 1873, Yale was struggling in
its own way with changes then transforming American higher educa
tion. Harvard’s appointment in 1869 of Charles W. Eliot, the university’s
first lay president, symbolized an end to clerical domination. Two years
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later, Noah Porter replaced Theodore Dwight Woolsey as Yale’s presi
dent. Although a clergyman, Porter also was a moral philosopher of
considerable repute and dedicated to his own vision of the modern
university.
Woolsey’s departure left Porter with the unattractive prospect of
teaching single-handedly the senior-year catchall course in mental and
moral philosophy they had previously shared. Hoped-for assistance
vanished with the resignation of Daniel Coit Gilman of the Sheffield
Scientific School, an unannounced presidential candidate and the one
person who might have taken over Woolsey’s part of the course. The
subsequent allotment of funds for a chair in “political and social sci
ence” placed Sumner in competition with a well-connected Congregationalist clergyman named Diman, who had heen showered with
academic offers since his appointment at Brown in 1864 and who was
soon the favorite of Yale faculty members who opposed Sumner. A year
of vintage academic politics ensued, including attempts to steer Sumner
to a less-prestigious (and unendowed] chair in ancient history or to
persuade him to withdraw his candidacy altogether, Sumner was finally
offered and accepted the new chair in political economy with high hopes
that it could be made “most influential on the future of this country.”
In most respects, Sumner was the consummate college reformer. Writ
ing in The Living Church, he welcomed Eliot’s appointment at Harvard,
arguing that American colleges could become true universities only by
overcoming their sectarian origins. At Yale, he endorsed a recent ex
periment to divide classes by academic rank rather than alphabetically
for recitations, and he even supported attempts to eliminate the tedious
recitations altogether. In his own courses, he replaced graded recitations
with a single final examination and made attendance optional, causing
Porter to warn that he was destroying the program “on which the whole
system of discipline and honors is founded.”
At the same time, Sumner rejected as worthless one Eliot proposal to
bring experts to the university to energize graduate studies. He likewise
distrusted extreme demands that the universities “keep up with the
times,” wanting only to assure that they not become bastions of “mere
traditionalism and stagnation.” Although admiring the German model,
he wanted the United States to build its universities upon the experience
and traditions of its colleges. With characteristic bluntness, he identified
poor endowment rather than curriculum as the heart of the matter. “It
is money, or the want of it, which is the root of all evil.” As in the Broad
Ghurch debates, Sumner again staked out an idealistic as well as prac-
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tical position, a balance between tradition and progress. As he turned
to public affairs, this balance would be more difficult to attain.

During the early Yale years (1873-78), Sumner was best known as
scholar-politician and polemicist rather than for any contributions to
social theory. “What is needed now,” he wrote, “is, not more thorough
theoretical discussion of the scholar-in-politics, but that a few more
should try it.” Sumner launched his career as scholar-in-politics in the
fall of 1873 when he ran successfully for New Haven aiderman, a po
sition he held for four years. The same year he also became an honorary
member of the New Haven Chamber of Congress, which he used as a
personal forum for his favored causes. At the national level, he joined
the recently founded American Social Science Association (ASSA),
where he served on a newly established finance committee until finally
resigning in disgust at ASSA’s congenital do-goodism. In November
1877, he joined an electoral commission to investigate fraud in New
Orleans during the recent presidential election. The following year, he
testified before a congressional committee investigating labor unrest.
In politics, Sumner was a Republican less from conviction than from
the absence of a viable alternative. The Democrats historically repre
sented the excesses of Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism he most de
spised, while the GOP attracted most of the “best men” in the North
and, more importantly, in New Haven. Disgusted by the corruption of
the Grant years and dismayed by Republican policy on tariffs and the
money issue, he shared the outlook of future Mugwumps, as indepen
dents in both parties would later be dubbed. In the fall of 1877, he
shocked friends and political allies by throwing his support to the Dem
ocrat, Samuel Ulden.
As polemicist, Sumner attempted to reach a popular audience by way
of public lectures, newspapers, essays, and books. Among public issues,
he focused especially on the currency issue, then agitated by calls for
the retirement of the Civil War “greenbacks” and later by the establish
ment of a “bimetal” standard of gold and silver. He also focused on free
trade, now apparently doomed by the protective tariffs of the war years.
He devoted his first two books—A History of American Currency (1874),
and Lectures on the History of Protection (1877)—respectively, to these
two issues.
Sumner’s own experience with the depreciating value of money
through inflation gave him a personal stake in the currency issue. The
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size of his debt to his friends and his concern over financing further
work in Europe or the Far East left a legacy of hatred for paper currency
and inflation. Although he paid little attention to the demonetarization
of silver in 1873 (a move critics later dubbed the “Crime of ’73”), he was
distressed as leading economists otherwise within the classicist camp
supported international bimetallism, among them his Yale colleague
Francis A. Walker. After holding his fire for several years, Sumner at
tacked bimetallism in 1878, placing himself in open conflict with po
tential allies.
In his attacks on the protective tariffs, Sumner characteristically com
bined appeals to the pocketbook and to morality. Tariffs were ostensibly
a levy on overseas trade, but Sumner saw them as a tax to benefit some
Americans over others. “The victim and the beneficiary are amongst
ourselves,” he argued, since consumers ultimately paid in higher prices.
Worse, the tax was an indirect one, leaving those taxed unaware of their
burden.
Although few Americans appeared so well-equipped to raise eco
nomic theory to a new level, Sumner sought to popularize rather than
to extend classical British theory. More interested in practical problems
than theoretical issues, he instead catalogued the dire consequences,
past and present, of paper money and high tariffs. After a visit with
Sumner in New Haven in 1875, Alfred Marshall, the brilliant British
economist, judged him to be a man of “enormous ability, but one lack
ing “the nature fitted for epoch-making truths.”
Disillusionment with politics during 1877, a result both of his per
sonal experience as New Haven aiderman and of his assessment of vot
ing fraud in the Hayes-Tilden election, presaged a shift in Sumner s
priorities during the next decade. “I found out that I was more likely to
do more harm than good in politics than almost any other kind of man,
he later wrote of his career as aiderman, “because I did not know the
rules of the game and did not want to learn them.” After an abortive
attempt to return to the Republican fold, he repudiated politics as a
waste of time, declining even to vote in the 1880 election. Accordingly,
during the 1880s, he argued for the necessary separation of politics and
economics and for the need to eliminate political corruption through
civil service reform.
Meanwhile, developments in the industrial sphere shifted the focus
of Sumner’s interest to labor and big business and, finally, to Marxism.
Responding to the bloody summer of railway strikes in 1877, he penned
an angry article meant for but not finally published in the North Amer
ican Review, following it with several other essays on labor and strikes
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throughout the 1880s. Although the secretive formation of the Standard
Oil trust in 1882 heralded a new phase of industrial comhination, Sum
ner, like most of his contemporaries, realized its implications only grad
ually. In a series in the Independent in 1888-89, however, he took direct
aim at the emerging “plutocracy,” a concept that joined middle-class
fear of industrial combination with the patrician dislike of vulgar wealth
he had earlier expressed in his sermons. Narrowly defined by Sumner,
plutocracy referred to “a political form in which the controlling force is
wealth.” But more generally it enshrined the “increasing thirst for lux
ury” and the acquisitive appetites of the man “on the make.” He con
cluded with disgust that “the principle of plutocracy is that money buys
whatever the owner of money wants.”
He also gradually realized that Karl Marx was not just another social
ist. Initially he knew Marx only as the leader of the International who
wanted “to carry the war into the arena of scientific economy.” But
Marx’s treatment of “capital” was soon at the center of Sumner’s in
dictment of the entire socialist movement. When the visit of Marx’s
daughter and son-in-law to the United States in 1886 stimulated new
interest in his theories, Sumner took aim at such concepts as “proletar
iat” and “bourgeoisie.” “No American artisan” can understand these
terms, he charged. “Such ideas are a part of a foreign dress of a set of
ideas which are not yet naturalized.”
As Sumner moved from the mugwumpish scholar-in-politics to full
blown controversialist, his prose gained strength and power. His early
style, as his biographer Donald Bellomy has written in The Moulding of
an Iconoclast (1979), was “frequently stilted, often latinate, more than
a little long-winded,” probably due to his status as a newcomer attempt
ing to use an official rhetoric, but lacking the confidence or experience
to do so gracefully. Although his friend Henry Holt finally published
the History of American Currency, Holt confessed that it never failed to
put him to sleep. Only in extemporaneous speeches and student lectures
did Sumner display the boldness that would become his hallmark. As
he directed his attention from public policy to social theory in the early
1880s, this boldness quickly won national attention.

Social Theorist

During his early clerical years, Sumner had dipped into Herbert Spen
cer’s Social Statics (1850) and First Principles (1861), but found both
works too “metaphysical” for his taste. During the seventies he dis-
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played only passing rhetorical interest in the Englishman’s work. His
first recorded use of the phrase “survival of the fittest” in 1872 was in
the context of appealing for charity toward the weak. However, he also
apparently read the Study of Sociology when it appeared in serial form
in 1872 and eventually thought enough of it to assign it as a text at Yale.
For this decision, he soon earned an undeserved reputation as America’s
“leading Spencerian.”
Until the early 1880s, Sumner’s social thought echoed other works he
had read. Among these were Harriet Martineau’s Illustrations of Political
Economy (1834), a primer of classical economics by example, and Fran
cis Lieber’s On Civil Liberty and Self-Government (1853), whose protosociological emphasis on customs and institutions informed his later
distrust of schemes based on “natural rights.” In Woolsey’s course at
Yale, he read enough of Francis Wayland’s Elements of Political Econ
omy (1837) to convince him that Martineau was basically right about
economic issues. Later he added David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and
others in the British tradition.
Growing attack on this tradition in the late 1870s first forced Sumner
to rethink his basic assumptions. From overseas, this attack was spear
headed by representatives of the German Historical School, the Kathedersozialisten (“professorial socialists,” as Sumner rendered the term)
and their American disciples who founded the American Economic As
sociation in 1884. More popularly, it found voice in Henry George’s
Progress and Poverty (1879), Lawrence Gronlund’s Cooperative Gommonwealth (1883), and Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward (1888).
All bothered Sumner: George for his attack on Malthus, Gronlund as a
homegrown socialist, and Bellamy as the model for the “absurd effort”
to plan a better world with “a slate and pencil.” In one way or other,
George, Gronlund, and Bellamy figured in most of his essays of the
eighties. Social scientists seemed little better. He wrote in the late sev
enties that the social sciences were the stronghold of many “pernicious
dogmatisms.” The economists, he added with reference to the German
school, “instead of holding together and sustaining . . . the scientific
authority and the positive truth of their doctrines, break up and run
hither and thither.”
In a series on “Socialism” and “Sociology” between 1878 and 1882,
Sumner defended Malthus in particular, fired in part by Henry George’s
attack on Malthusianism in Progress and Poverty. “Human beings tend
to multiply beyond the power of a limited area of land to support life,
under a given stage of the arts, and a given standard of living,” he wrote
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in Scribner’s in 1878, summarizing the Malthusian doctrine on the eve
of George’s attack. Although technology and emigration had temporarily
suspended population pressure, the “struggle for existence” was ines
capable. This struggle pitted men against nature, he explained, his
model being the individual against the wilderness as pictured in one of
Martineau’s Illustrations. Parallel to the struggle for existence was, ac
cording to Sumner, the “competition of life,” which set the social rules
governing the relation of individuals in society, private property being
one example. Although the relationship between the struggle for exis
tence and the competition of life remained vague, Sumner insisted on
the distinction between them. Confusing the two, socialists erred in
blaming the rules of the competition of life for hardships that were really
due to the struggle for existence.
Henry George, in turn, had “wasted his effort” because “the ‘Malthu
sian doctrine’ is swallowed up in a great biological law,” Sumner wrote
in a review. Since Sumner remained virtually ignorant of Darwin’s the
ory, he meant only to assert that the biologist lent support to the general
idea of struggle as a starting point for all speculation. But why not carry
Darwinism fiulher? Indulging a flair for epigram, Sumner appeared to
do precisely this in several speeches and at least one published essay,
but only between 1879 and the early 1880s. “The Law of the survival of
the fittest was not made by man,” the argument went. “We can only, by
interfering with it, produce the survival of the unfittest.” With this
phrasemaking, he ceased to be an academic of modest fame. The specter
of “social Darwinist” was soon to haunt him.

Meanwhile, at Yale, a conflict with Noah Porter forced Sumner to think
more systematically about science, an issue unresolved in his clerical
days. The struggle began in 1879 when President Porter objected to his
assigning Herbert Spencer’s The Study of Sociology in a senior social
science class. Although Sumner and Porter attempted to settle the matter
privately, both went public after a report on the struggle appeared in the
New York Times in 1880. Sumner challenged Porter’s right to proscribe
textbooks, and he threatened to resign in an open letter to the Yale
Corporation and faculty in 1881. In the end, both could claim a victory
of sorts: Sumner, because he refused to concede the principle: Porter,
because Sumner stopped assigning the book.
The major issue in the affair was not so much religion vs. science or
even classroom freedom or professionalism. It was the definition of
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social science itself. Sumner’s own convoluted development of this
issue revealed how uncertain his own grasp of it was, especially in its
social dimensions. “All that we can affirm with certainty is that social
phenomena are subject to law, and that the natural laws of the social
order are in their entire character like the laws of physics,” he noted
weakly in an essay on “Sociology.”

The writing and reception of What Social Classes Owe to Each Other
(1884) pushed Sumner further down the road to a narrowly inductive
view of science. Ironically, this hook would also earn him a reputation
as the Gilded Age’s leading “social Darwinist.” Although the hook dealt
ostensibly with class relations in industrial society, it owed its central
theme and its emotional edge to events in Sumner’s personal life during
the previous two years, the most important of which was the death of
his father in 1881 after a long downhill slide in health and fortune. For
the son, as numerous commentators have observed, the death was the
occasion to reflect on the enormous debt he owed to the Lancashire
mechanic who, despite poor business sense and numerous reverses,
asked from life only a fair chance.
Yet there was more to it than that. Thomas Sumner’s failures, no less
than his principles, provided a lesson in the fruits of irresponsibility.
On his death, his son found himself saddled with the emotionally drain
ing business of paying off creditors and untangling his father’s botched
affairs. Irresponsibility also came home to roost in the reappearance of
his brother, Joe, a ne’er-do-well (in Sumner’s view), whose wayward
ways had never stopped him in the past from rubbing in the fact that he
made more money than his “successful” older sibling. Now in financial
trouble, Joe regularly nagged his brother for loans through the early
1880s. About this time, Sumner also helped a former housekeeper with
money to get married, only to have her return later, a penniless widow
with children to support. Added to these burdens was the emotional
collapse of Sumner’s always-fragile wife Jeannie, which strained his
finances and sense of duty to the near-breaking point. If he suggested
that charity begins at home, he had his reasons.
In Social Classes, Sumner forged these personal experiences and a
mounting fear of social unrest into a celebration of the “forgotten man,”
arriving at the unsettling conclusion that social classes apparently owe
nothing to one other. In structure and tone, the work combined pulpit
oratory and deductive logic. Sermon-style chapter titles summoned the
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faithful to the weekly meeting: “That It Is Not Wicked To Be Rich; Nay,
Even, That It Is Not Wicked to Be Richer than One’s Neighbor.” School
book logic captured the essence of all humanitarian schemes: “that A
and B decide what C shall do for D” (or X, as in the lecture version
reprinted here). The burden always fell on number three (C): the “for
gotten man.”
Although Sumner invested a good deal in this portrait, the economic
and class position of his “forgotten man” was tantalizingly vague. As a
victim of protectionism or excise taxes, he was virtually the entire Amer
ican population. As the victim of legislation, he was all taxpayers except
those who initiated taxes and those who benefitted from them. However,
the “forgotten man” was not the “ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed” worker,
as Franklin Roosevelt implied in appropriating Sumner’s phrase five
decades later. Rather, politically, the “forgotten man” foreshadowed the
newspaper cartoon figure, “John Q. Public,” looking puzzled at the an
tics of elected officials. Economically, he represented that large segment
of the American population who would become “middle class” in the
mid-twentieth century, but who, like Thomas Sumner, still languished
as artisans offering their services to the highest bidder.
In a somewhat incongruous final installment, Sumner explained
“Wherefore We Should Love One Another.” “Men . . . owe to men, in
the chances and perils of this life, aid and sympathy, on account of the
common participation in human frailty and folly,” he wrote in an atten
uated version of his earlier theory of “human solidarity.” However, “pri
vate and personal” relations were one thing and science another. “There
is no injunction, no ‘ought’ in political economy at all,” he intoned. “It
does not tell man what he ought to do.” Only an apparent step back from
his earlier conclusions, this chapter showed Sumner again taking com
fort in private-public, heart-head dualisms that he earlier applied to
theological problems. The split now, however, was between individual
emotion and social science, a harbinger of the “ought-is” distinction of
the objectivist, behavioristic sociology his work later inspired.
Social Classes invoked neither the names nor the rhetoric of Spencer
or Darwin, but its appearance revived charges that Sumner was misusing
biology to justify a dog-eat-dog social order. Although the New York
Times leveled this charge in the spring of 1883 in response to one of his
“fittest-unfittest” flourishes in an unpublished speech, Sumner faced it
explicitly for the first time in print a year later in an exchange in the
Index, the journal of the liberal and ecumenical Free Religious Associ
ation of Boston. The editor, denying that “fitness” had meaning in any
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social sense, noted that Sumner’s emphasis on human morality and
reason seemed to belie the thrust of his closing epigram. Sumner himself
equivocated. “Rattlesnakes survive where horses perish,” he wrote, con
ceding his critics’ main point. “The ‘economic harmonies’ are a great
subject,” he wrote in June 1884 in the last of several apologies on the
subject, denying that he held to Darwinian doctrine as charged. Al
though he promised to “publish [his] notion in proper detail,” he instead
effectively dropped all use of analogical language, Spencerian or oth
erwise, and let the subject die.
This change brought another important if subtle shift in emphasis in
Sumner’s essays of the late 1880s and early 1890s. As he turned his
attention to monopoly and Marxism, he escalated his assault on meta
physics, redefining abstract conceptions in terms of hard, irrefutable,
material facts. A term such as “proletariat,” thus reduced, had virtually
no meaning; the real social contest was between the “House of Have and
the House of Want.” “Monopoly” referred to the natural monopoly in
herent in the technology of the railway and telegraph and was in no way
a product of “capitalist society.” “Capital” was not, as Marx maintained,
a product of an exploitative system, but was rather the banked reserves
of past effort.
A measure of this change, “The Absurd Effort to Make Over the World”
(1894), differed from Social Classes in tone and argument. Unlike his
earlier appeals to logic or the “laws of nature,” he now answered social
reformers with an “appeal to the facts,” historical facts in particular.
“[All] the allegations of general mischief, social corruption, wrong, and
evil in our society must be referred back to those who make them for
particulars and specifications,” he wrote. “As they are offered to us we
cannot allow them to stand, because we discern in them faulty obser
vation of facts, or incorrect interpretation of facts, or a construction of
facts according to some philosophy, or misunderstanding of phenomena
and their relations, or incorrect inferences, or crooked deductions.”
But Sumner also tacitly admitted that, in his own way, he himself had
been guilty of “the vain fancy that we can make or guide the movement.”
Although in later years he took up his pen to oppose free silver, condemn
American imperialism, and attack the socialist Upton Sinclair in
Collier’s in 1904, he increasingly avoided public controversy. In this
sense, “The Absurd Effort” was Sumner’s own valedictory after one
decade as educational reformer and scholar-in-politics, and a second
as social theorist trying to figure out what a science of society should
look like.
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Anti-Imperialist to Sociologist
In 1890, Sumner fell victim to what was termed a “nervous illness.” His
personal problems and poor health could not take the punishing work
schedule that had resulted in sixty articles and two books in the previous
three years. In December, he set sail for an extended stay in Europe,
financed in part by forty-two loyal supporters, among them Henry Holt,
Chauncey Depew, and William C. Whitney.
Although Sumner resumed his duties at Yale in the fall of 1892, the
collapse took a permanent toll on his energies and output. Between 1876
and 1890, he had published some 108 articles and 7 books. In the five
years following his breakdown, he wrote “only” four articles and two
books. Although in 1896 he added another dozen articles and a book,
he averaged only two articles a year during the rest of his career and left
uncompleted his projected “Science of Society,” save for the substantial
fragment that appeared as Folkways (1906). Although ill health alone
does not explain the tone and mood of his later work, he judged the
world from a bed of pain.
Personal disillusionment, as in the late 1870s, had important impli
cations for Sumner’s intellectual development. The growing gap be
tween American ideals and current realities pushed him toward both a
thoroughgoing relativism and a reification of national folly soon to be
termed “folkways” and “mores.” For example, the United States histor
ically had one set of principles. However, embarking on a war with Spain
in 1898, it found some of these principles inconvenient and dropped
them. “There are no dogmatic propositions of political philosophy
which are universally and always true,” he wrote with new-found res
ignation, The Spanish-American War also dramatized the difference be
tween “purposes” and “consequences,” a distinction that led directly to
the behavioristic orientation of Folkways.
The blustering Theodore Roosevelt, along with the “fads” and “de
lusions” of the progressive era, completed this descent into political
cynicism. With T.R. at the helm, Sumner feared that America was en
tering its dangerous “glory days.” However, to Sumner the alternative
of William Jennings Bryan seemed even worse. “We shall have to vote
for Teddy in 1908 in order to ward off Bryan and Hades,” Sumner com
mented in 1906, but, in so doing, we would be “disgraced forever.”
Although Sumner in fact supported his former student William Howard
Taft in 1908, more than a decade of Bryanism left its mark—Sumner
judged Bryan’s proposals to be not merely passing folly, but significant
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indicators of changes in the national “mores,” a term he first adopted in
1899 when he began to work seriously on his proposed science of
society.
In Folkways, Sumner molded his disgust at the course of American
politics and society into one of the five or six most important books in
sociology published in the United States in the years before the First
World War. On the surface, the thesis of Folkways was bequilingly
straightforward—humanity is driven by four basic instincts: hunger,
love, vanity, and fear. In all societies, individuals attempt to satisfy these
drives as best they can. Through trial and error, one method of satisfying
demand becomes customary for all or a significant part of a society.
Sumner termed these methods “folkways.” Initially experimental, folk
ways gain a moral sanction through a process of comparison and reflec
tion. The mores are folkways grown moral and reflective. “Good” and
“bad” have no meaning outside of the mores. Since those mores that
command the support of the most powerful groups survive, “nothing
but might has ever made right.”
Sumner then complicated things by adding that the mores are some
times mischievous and even wrong, sometimes shaped by accidents,
irrationality, and “pseudo-knowledge.” Some folkways are “positively
harmful.” The results were things he increasingly disliked: “advertisers
who exaggerate,” “the ways of journalism,” “electioneering devices,”
and “oratorical and dithyrambic extravagances in politics.” Although
these contemporary horrors were “not properly part of the mores,” they
were “symptoms of them.”
The problem was that the judgment of mores as “bad” and “good”
seemed to imply an external standard that, by Sumner’s own accounting,
existed only within the mores. This standard, however, was not a patch
work of youthful assumptions smuggled in through a back door (as some
of his critics later maintained), but rather the scientific outlook itself,
an outlook that an elite (the “classes”) introduced into the mores in the
modern democratic period. This “matter-of-factness” (as Sumner’s for
mer student Veblen termed it) allowed the social scientist, by examining
the mores historically, to determine which had proved conducive to
societal survival. The mores, that is, contained a self-correcting element.
Science thus provided an escape from the dreary logic of mightmakes-right, anathema to a middle class threatened by socialism on the
one hand and plutocracy on the other. The key was the difference be
tween a posterior and an anterior view of things. In the posterior view,
“nothing but might has ever made right, and... nothing but might makes
right now.” In the anterior view, the case was different. “If we are about
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to take some action and are debating the right of it, the might that can
be brought to support the view of it has nothing to do with the right of
it.” Science, when applied to the study of history (the sociologists’ lab
oratory), could provide this anterior view—could, that is, demonstrate
the superiority of one set of values over others, specifically the “virtue
policy” over the “success policy.”
Science was both relative and absolute, Sumner continued, restating
a lifelong distinction between science as speculation and science as
method. As “ism,” science was subject to “fashion” as much as other
human endeavors were. Even “evolutionism,” although “now accepted
as a final fact,” might well turn out to be “only a fashion.” On the other
hand, science, defined as apprehension of facts-as-they-are, was not rel
ative or ephemeral. It was the scientific outlook in this narrow sense
that was gradually entering the mores of the “classes.”
Working to these conclusions, Sumner attempted finally to come to
grips with Darwin early in the new century, two decades after the furor
he created in the eighties. His guide was his disciple Albert G. Keller,
himself then immersed in the Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent
of Man (1871) for a course on human evolution. While the younger man
lectured, various questions took shape in Sumner’s mind. Did the mores
evolve? Could they be arranged “in a logical scale of advance” to support
a theory of progress? Were they subject to natural selection? Could they
be analyzed statistically? In a series of unpublished essays, his answer
in each case was no. In the end, Sumner’s eleventh-hour brush with
Darwinian evolution merely confirmed his lifelong Baconianism, now
almost caricatured in his celebration of “facts.” “The Scientific Attitude
of Mind,” he told a meeting of Sigma Xi in 1905, produced a “knowledge
of reality” that was neither a philosophy nor a mere consensus of trained
observers. His “thirst” for this reality amounted to a passion.
But did the incorporation of the scientific outlook within the mores
provide a basis for conscious social policy directed by a scientific elite?
Sumner sometimes seemed to imply as much “The historical classes
have ... selected purposes, and have increased ways of fulfilling them.”
Whether for good or ill, they introduced “variation” that produced
change. In a most un-Sumnerian statement, he saw the goal of the “sci
ence of society” to be the development of “an art of societal administra
tion” that was “intelligent, effective, and scientific.” In the manuscript
version of one of his final essays, he insisted that the “masses” acknowl
edge “the authority of the specialist and expert.”
In a more fundamental sense, however, his narrowly Baconian defi
nition of the mores as “facts” distanced his proposals from those of
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progressives (such as fellow sociologist Lester Ward], who called for
“sociocracy” and “creative intelligence.” Although the mores were not
“natural laws” in the older sense, as “facts” they were just as inexorable
in operation. In their ubiquitous inevitability, they ruled out most social
engineering almost as surely as did the “laws of physics” to which Sum
ner had appealed in the 1880s—^but only almost. Although Folkways
resounded with warnings against precipitous reform, Sumner only in
tended to insist that proposed changes conform to the mores. Although
the mores of the “classes” (including the scientific outlook] were his
torically less basic than those of the “masses,” this latest “variation”
promised a better, if fragile, future.
There was, of course, a trick in Sumner’s hard-nosed empiricism. The
mores, insofar as they embraced beliefs as well as behavior, were not
“facts” in quite the same sense as tables and chairs are. As one critic
later asked: “Who ever saw a tradition?” Rather, the notion of the mores
represented a new way of conceptualizing social reality. The term was
no less an imaginative construct than “Gemeinschaft” or “primary
group.” Mores were “facts,” not literally, but by analogy: They had the
“authority of facts.”
If old fashioned in one sense, Sumner’s Baconian view of science
disposed him to see something that escaped many reform-minded con
temporaries. That is that social institutions and customs, although ini
tially instrumental, assume a coercive character that transcends utility.
Coercive here means that they are as difficult to deny as the “facts” of
the natural world—a view similar to the one being developed by the
French sociologist Emile Durkheim. As Sumner explained toward the
end of his life, like natural “facts,” the mores are “very difficult to dis
cuss” and may be judged only in the light of history, and then only
“within narrow limits.” This coercive power did not rule out prudent
change; but it explained why, as he put it earlier in one of his more
quotable lines, “it is the greatest folly ... to sit down with a slate and
pencil to plan out a new social world.”

Prophet and Legacy
During his final decade, Sumner’s professional and personal woes did
not abate. The election of Arthur T. Hadley as Yale’s president in 1899
brought concessions to the old antiscientific Yale College tradition and
a new emphasis on publication over teaching, both disturbing to Sum-
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ner. Keller later confided that Sumner’s feelings toward Hadley were
“deep and powerful and profane.” Although Sumner gradually re
covered from his nervous exhaustion, continuing debility forced him to
abandon his “Science of Society” project. A stroke in late 1907 crippled
his right arm for several months. One bright spot came two years later
with his election as president of the recently founded American Soci
ological Society (A.S.S.). However, this honor finally proved to be his
undoing when he suffered a final stroke after dragging himself to New
York through a snowstorm to deliver the presidential address at the
annual meeting in December. After lingering for several months, he died
on April 10, 1910.
Increasingly during these final years, Sumner assumed the mantle of
prophet in jeremiads worthy of the American Puritans. Already evident
in his warnings against imperialism and war and in the posthumously
published “Bequests of the Nineteenth Century to the Twentieth” (1900),
this prophetic tone suffused the final portions of Folkways, where he
excoriated plutocracy and socialism alike. Preaching a “cult of success,”
plutocracy brought a “deep depreciation of all social interests,” he
wrote, while the socialists’ demand for “equality” posed an equal threat
to national survival.
In “Bequests,” Sumner also returned to the issue of “tradition” and
“progress” and the related problems of cultural relativism, first devel
oping the distinction between the thinking of the “masses” and “the
classes” that reappeared in Folkways. Current clamor for “rights” and
“power to the people” rested on a “popularity theory of truth, wisdom
and right.” To this he then opposed the “expert theory.” “ ‘Authority’ is
out of date, but everyone must know that competent authority (on every
thing but political and social questions) is what we have to live by,” he
continued. But should an exception be made here? Although Sumner
muffled his answer in a series of rhetorical questions, he made it clear
that he had little sympathy for the “man-on-the-curbstone” who “resents
expert advice.” In the process, he also revealed his own frustrations.
“The doctrine seems to be that if a man who was once humble and
ignorant uses all the means mortals have to find out something, the result
is that he knows less than his humble and ignorant comrades who never
made any such attempt.”
In “Mores of the Present and Future” (1909), this pessimism shaded
into cynicism and near-despair. The eighteenth century “bequeathed to
the nineteenth a great mass of abstract notions about rights and about
the ultimate notions of political philosophy,” he wrote, many of which
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were later enshrined in laws and constitutions. “Rights, justice, liberty,
and equality are the watchwords instead of church, faith, heaven, and
hell. These slogans, and the mores associated with them, were possible
only because humanity was currently in an “exceptional period” during
which global underpopulation” and “increasing control of natural
forces” temporarily eased the “struggle for existence” against nature
Echoing the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, but on a worldwide
scale, he warned that the inevitable return of “overpopulation and
harder conditions” threatened an end to democracy. “The groups and
parties will form and war will occur between them. Great dogmas will
be put forth at all stages of these movements and appropriate watch
words will never be wanting.”
Although the terms “folkways,” “mores,” “in-group,” and “out-group”
soon made their way into the literature. Folkways was initially less than
a success in the limited arena where professional reputations are mea
sured. The early reviewers faulted equally its methodology and its po
litical implications. As one Chicago sociologist remarked: Ethnological
data “seem at times to overweigh the book by their sheer bulk and mul
tiplicity.” Although at least one reviewer saw an affinity between Sum
ner’s mores and Durkheim’s “social facts.” he made the point only to
damn both as “objectivists.” When a later generation became interested
in the notion that social usages had the coercive power of “facts,” it
turned to the Rules of Sociological Method (1895), not to Folkways.
As the social sciences became increasingly specialized, Sumner
seemed to represent an older, more amateurish age. Albion Small of
Chicago later confessed that he never thought of Sumner as a sociologist
until, quite to his surprise, Sumner was elected president of the A.S.S.
To others, his writings seemed closer to anthropology or philosophical
histoy. and his apparent lack of “methodology” compounded the prob
lem. “The Method—if it can be called a method,” commented the urban
sociologist Robert Park, consisted essentially of collecting facts that
Sumner barely analyzed.
Others faulted Folkways for its assumptions'as much as for its meth
odology. The sociologist Edward Ross suggested that, although postu
lating possible differences between perceptions of right and good by the
masses vs. those by the elite, Sumner failed to explore those differences,
leaving open the possibility that the “mores are never right” because
they are necessarily adaptations to past conditions. Although this charge
erroneously equated Sumner with the most extreme of cultural relativ
ists, its very existence suggested that his resolution of the problem was
less than successful.
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Problems in Sumner’s formulation explain some of this criticism and
even neglect, but intellectual merit was only part of the story. Another
was Yale itself. Since the university still considered undergraduate ed
ucation as important as graduate or professional training, Sumner left
behind no “school” or even disciples, except for the all-too-faithful
Keller, whose curmudgeon demeanor and rigid adherence to “Sumnerology” proved to be a barrier to cross-fertilization with theories at Chi
cago, Columbia, and elsewhere. Sumner himself trained only six
doctoral students: Kate Halliday Claghorn (1896); James E. Cutler (1903);
Henry Pratt Fairchild (1909); Arthur James Todd (1911); Frederick E.
Lumley (1912); and Charles W. Coulter (1914). All occupied positions
at academic institutions of the second rank, and at least four were pri
marily concerned with social work. Although Fairchild published Gen
eral Sociology (1934), he was better known for The Melting Pot Mistake
(1926) and polemical pieces supporting eugenics, birth control, and im
migration restriction. Lumley’s The Means of Social Control (1925) was
closest to the Folkways tradition, but owed equally as much to the
widely used Introduction to the Science of Sociology (1921), by Robert
E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, and to the work of Edward A. Ross and,
in any case, made no claim to originality.
The fact that the best-known of Sumner’s students and disciples re
pudiated his politics further diluted any legacy he might have claimed.
An avowed socialist and vigorous critic of big business. Fairchild pro
posed governmental action on a scale that would have made Sumner
wince, a factor that probably contributed to his dismissal at Yale in 1918
(“His continuance here would seriously hamper a development laid
down by Sumner, followed by me, and approved by the faculty,” Keller
wrote to a friend). During his tenure at Minnesota, Arthur J. Todd also
offended local conservatives, while Lumley, in The Means of Social
Control, offered instruction to any who “find it necessary or desirable
to take a hand in the work of control.” Among the most prominent of
non-Yale disciples, Luther Bernard of Chicago (Ph.D. 1911) drew on
Folkways for a dissertation advocating an “objective standard for social
control.” However, Bernard’s maverick behavior within the profession
and his espousal of a curious brand of populist authoritarianism did
little to foster any recognizable “Sumner tradition.”
In the interwar years, Sumner’s work was also caught in a political
crossfire between proponents and opponents of the progressive-New
Deal tradition. Carrying their earlier battles beyond the grave, socialist
Upton Sinclair launched a scurrilous attack in The Goose Step (1923),
labeling Sumner a “prime minister of . . . plutocratic education” who
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took “ghoulish delight” in “glorifying conunercialism,” In Man’s Hough
Hoad (1932), Keller retaliated with an anti-New Deal rendition of The
Science of Society (1927), his ponderous four-volume revision of Sum
ner s unpublished magnum opus. Responding in kind, liberals and so
cialists of various stripes launched the campaign that made Sumner a
symbol of every imaginable excess of nineteenth-century capitalism.
Although Keller was not without blame (since, in addition to his own
propagandizing, his renditions of his mentor’s work often distorted the
original, notably in his insistence that the mores developed by a process
of social selection”), he was frankly appalled. “Some persons hope
lessly allergic to ‘isms’ and ‘ismics’ have been ushered into the wrong
pew, he wrote in a 1944 review of Richard Hofstadter’s portrait of Sum
ner’s “social Darwinism.” But the label stuck.
In the post-World War II era, economists joined the attack, now sup
ported by the work of John Maynard Keynes and his disciples. These
critics argued that Sumner’s insistence that any government interven
tion would weaken the joint struggle for existence was premised on the
dubious assumption of full employment and an ignorance of the im
portance of consumer demand in mature industrial societies. Static and
short-run, Sumner’s analysis showed little understanding of the work
ings of impure or imperfect competition, which allows less than opti
mum allocation of resources under laissez-faire.
Meanwhile Sumner left a sociological legacy of sorts in a growing
interest in behavioristic and “objectivist” approaches as case studies,
statistical analyses, urban ecology, and other empirical work supplanted
the armchair theorizing (as it was now labeled) of prewar sociology. As
Robert Park put it, “The effect of his researches was to lay a foundation
or more realistic, more objective, and more systematic studies in the
held of human nature and society than had existed up to that time.” In
doctoral theses, a younger generation of objectivists seconded the point
among them William F. Ogburn of Chicago and F. Stuart Chapin of Min
nesota, both leaders in efforts to make sociology more behavioristic in
the interwar years. For these younger sociologists and their followers
social activities, previously studied for their contributions to human
well-being, became the impersonal data of science.
this objectivist legacy was no less ironic than portraits of Sumner’s
social Darwinism. For him, a “scientific attitude” offered an absolute
Jandard to judge “errors” in the mores. In contrast, Ogburn and his
disciples translated objectivity into a creed of the service intellectual
more interested in the how than the why of social policy. At the same
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time, as agents of the emerging welfare state, they fostered a social en
gineering often longer on unintended consequences than positive re
sults. College students compounded the irony hy turning to Folkways
for support of a now-fashionahle cultural relativism that viewed no tra
ditions or institutions to be better than others. Both interpretations
would have made Sumner shudder. A moralist to the end, he prescribed
in the act of describing. In treating mores as fact, he pictured an objective
reality against which all plans for social reconstruction must be judged.
Objectivity, in a word, did not mean ethical neutrality, social engineer
ing, or unthinking relativism.
In portraits of Sumner’s “social Darwinism,” irony joined outright
distortion. For one thing, most such accounts vastly exaggerated his
influence. Far from being the Gilded Age’s most influential theorist,
Sumner watched as most in his generation, wherever positioned on the
political spectrum, largely ignored his message, regardless of whether
his message was a call for discipline and self-denial, a denunciation of
luxury and the excesses of consumerism, or specific proposals for free
trade and a government free of the influence of special interests. Just as
Herbert Spencer finally felt that it was “Spencer against all of England,”
Sumner might easily have concluded that his alleged “influence” ex
isted primarily in the minds of those whose own interests require ogres.
Charges of “social Darwinism” also caricature the substance of Sum
ner’s thought. Although he defended private property and individual
enterprise, he did not celebrate a struggle for existence or believe that
Darwinism (or any other -ism) justified the dog-eat-dog struggle of mod
ern America. Monumental struggles lay in the future, he warned in one
of his last essays, but he abhorred the prospect. If he ever successfully
resolved the issues of tradition and progress or morality and science,
the creative tension between them enabled him to see the complexity
of society and the intractability of custom and tradition more clearly
than his more sanguine contemporaries. The naturalism of his later
thought expressed a growing pessimism over human willingness (al
though not ability) to use social science responsibly to reshape the
mores.
More than a century and a half since Sumner’s birth, the successes
and accomplishments of American capitalism and form of government
stand in spectacular contrast to the collapse of the state socialism he so
vigorously opposed. Yet it is as a critic of American society rather than
an apologist for it that he most commands our attention. As contending
factions continue to clamor in the political marketplace, “watchwords,”
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as he predicted, are not wanting: From “deregulation,” “balanced
budget,” and “standards” on the one side, to “tax fairness,” “social jus
tice,” and “diversity” on the other. As the first two translate into political
scandal and skyrocketing deficits, plutocracy again appears to threaten
the republic. At the other extreme, “tax fairness” cloaks an age-old im
pulse to “soak the rich,” while the relativism implicit in calls for “di
versity” seems to some critics to herald a “closing of the American
mind.”
Although Sumner offers limited guidance on the specifics of current
policy, his bold address of underlying issues provides a model of the
hard-headed analysis too often missing in these debates—one major
reason for renewed interest in his work during the past two decades (see
bibliography). As the historian Bruce Curtis has put it, it was Sumner’s
virtue “to peer into mysteries where there were no eternal verities” and
to celebrate the “moral absolutes of honesty, work, responsibility, and
moral courage.” To contemporary philosophers of science, his naively
inductive view of science may appear hopelessly old-fashioned, just as
developments in the economic and political realm have outrun some (if
not all) of his specific proposals. Yet behind his defense of the “scientific
attitude” and his polemics lay a regard for the truth and a disdain of
sham and hypocrisy that are ever in short supply. For this reason alone,
he deserves another hearing.

Robert C. Bannister

Robert C. Bannister is Scheuer Professor of History, Swarthmore College

Editor’s Note
In choosing among Sumner’s voluminous writings, I followed several
guidelines. Selections are grouped with reference to the various profes
sional and social roles Sumner assumed during his career, from Epis
copal clergyman to sociologist, thus roughly integrating the thematic
and the chronological. When deciding between comparable essays, I
chose those in which Sumner presented arguments in general terms,
rather than those encumbered by examples or disagreements with other
writers. Previously unpublished works are transcribed from the Sumner
Papers at Yale. Where they occur, misspellings are silently corrected.
Essays previously collected are reprinted as they appear in War and
Other Essays (1911), Earth Hunger and Other Essays (1913), The Chal
lenge of Facts and Other Essays (1914), and The Forgotten Man and
Other Essays, ed. Albert G. Keller; and Essays of William Graham Sum
ner (2 vols., 1934), ed. Albert G. Keller and Maurice R. Davie. All were
published by the Yale University Press. Sumner’s footnotes are elimi
nated, except for several explanatory notes in previously unpublished
pieces. With the exception of the excerpts from Folkways (Boston: Ginn
and Company, 1906), all pieces are published in their entirety. Material
in brackets is mine unless otherwise noted.
I want to thank Yale University for granting me access to the Sumner
Papers and for permission to reprint previously unpublished manu
scripts and the Yale University Press for permission to include “LaissezFaire.” I also wish to thank Judith A. Schiff and her staff at the Sterling
Library at Yale for assistance in photocopying materials from the Sumner
Papers.
Of the inevitable omissions, three deserve special comment. One is
the absence of What Social Classes Owe to Each Other (New York: Har
per and Brothers, 1883), one of Sumner’s best-known works. Rather than
present excerpts, I have chosen the full text of “The Forgotten Man,” a
synthesis of two chapters prepared for a lecture in which Sumner pre
sents his argument more succinctly than in the book version. Also omit
ted are examples of Sumner’s historical work, which includes
biographies of Andrew Jackson, Alexander Hamilton, and Robert Morris
and The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution (2 vols..
New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1891). Evidence of the importance of
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historical analysis in his thinking can he seen, however, in such pieces
as “Republican Government” and “Presidential Elections and Civil Ser
vice Reform.” Finally, Sumner’s work on currency reform and the tariff,
including A History of American Currency (New York: Henry Holt,
1874) and Lectures on the History o/Protection (1877), are also omitted,
although these issues surface in essays on other topics.
My own understanding of Sumner’s career is indebted to the many
scholars who have collected and interpreted his writings. In addition to
the six volumes edited by Albert G. Keller, alone and in concert with
Maurice Davie, later collections of his work include The Conquest of
the United States by Spain and Other Essays, ed. Murray Polner (Chi
cago: Regnery Press, n.d.); and Social Darwinism: Selected Essays of
William Graham Sumner, ed. Stow Persons (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1963). Among those scholars who have contributed to a
reassessment of Sumner in recent years, I am especially indebted to
Donald Bellomy, who generously shared with me the manuscript of his
thoughtful, marvelously detailed dissertation, “The Moulding of an
Iconoclast: William Graham Sumner, 1840-1885” (Harvard, 1980) and
an unpublished essay, “Relativism and Modernism in Sumner’s Folk
ways.” The introduction and notes draw heavily upon these works for
information, interpretation, and sequence of examples. I also wish to
thank Ross Paulsen of Augustana College for allowing me to see portions
of his forthcoming study of Sumner’s early sermons. Portions of the
introduction are adapted from my earlier treatment of Sumner in Social
Darwinism (2d ed., 1989), chapter 5, and Sociology and Scientism, chap
ters 6,7. For discussion of these and other sources see the bibliographical
essay.
For my original interest in Sumner, I owe a special debt to the late
Ralph Henry Gabriel (1890-1987), who first introduced me to Sumner
and to intellectual history as a Yale undergraduate more than three dec
ades ago.
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